Authors: Darius Griebenow, Michael Neugart, and Stefan Pichler
Abstract: Policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions are crucial in the fight against climate change. We explore whether political parties that implement environmental regulations face electoral backlash, which could hinder or even obstruct the adoption of climate policies. In particular, using detailed data from the European Union Emissions Trading System, we construct a new index for the stringency of environmental regulation at the regional level (NUTS2) for the European Union. This index is used to assess the economic impact of heightened environmental regulation on regions and to analyze voter reactions to these policies at the polls. Our findings reveal that green parties benefit from stricter environmental regulations in national elections, while this effect is absent in European Parliament elections. The increased vote share for green parties seems to result directly from the regulation rather than being mediated by improvements in regional economic performance.
Authors: Darius Griebenow, Jens J. Krüger, and Michael Neugart
Abstract: When setting up the world's largest emission trading system to combat carbon dioxide pollution, European policymakers were facing strong pressure to supply industry with free allocations of emission allowances. This has led to the issue of over-allocation of allowances with, however, limited evidence to which extent this over-allocation occurred. After all, measuring the extent of over-allocation properly requires the construction of a meaningful counter-factual. We propose an approach which exploits a policy change in the allocation of allowances in 2013, when the third phase of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) started. From then onward, electricity producers were not granted free allowances anymore, in contrast to all other installations which were endowed with allowances. By comparing these groups, we attempt to assess how installations would have behaved in Phase 3, had they still received free allowances as the comparison group did. Compared to Phase 2, electricity producers in Phase 3 were, on average, holding 505804 allowances less. This change in stocks is driven by the policy-induced reduction in the free allowances, while no change can be observed in purchases, sales, and carbon dioxide emissions.
Sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
Digital Green Tech funding measure – environmental technology meets digitalization. Duration: 9/2023 to 9/2025.
Short summary: Water management in Germany is neither resource-efficient nor does it meet needs as needed: drought leads to supply gaps, operation is not energy-optimal and there are pipe losses. New, flexible, resource-saving (resources: water, energy, money), but also comprehensible operating strategies are necessary. Although data-based methods of artificial intelligence and heuristic approaches hold considerable potential, questions arise immediately regarding the availability of the necessary data as well as the traceability and transparency of the approaches. These are the reason for the approval trap of autonomous systems. However, if market economy mechanisms are used, with adequate market design, the market's inherent resource and allocation efficiency can be used to achieve comprehensible, resource-efficient and needs-based operating strategies.
Project partners: Michael Neugart, Peter Pelz, Rolf Findeisen, Wilo SE, RheinEnergie
Authors: Herbert Dawid, Philipp Harting, and Michael Neugart
Abstract: We study how the use of machine-learning based algorithms for the determination of wage offers affects workers’ wages on online labor platforms. Firms use reinforcement-learning to update posted wages on the platform, and heterogeneous workers send applications based on the posted information. We show that if firms use a deep Q-network (DQN), as an example of a state-of-the-art machine learning algorithm, the emerging wages closely resemble the equilibrium outcome. However, slightly changing the setup of the algorithms can lead to substantial collusion and wages well below the equilibrium level. In particular, we identify a specific property of the algorithms, namely whether experience replay is used, which determines whether collusion occurs or not. Our findings are robust with respect to many features of the model, including the design of the online labor platform.
Author: Michael Neugart
Abstract: This paper brings individual level evidence to the hypothesis that women holding political offices affects mass mobilization. With a regression discontinuity design, I analyze the effect of close victories of directly elected female candidates in mixed-gender races at the federal elections in Germany in 2013 on individuals' decisions to turnout at the federal elections in Germany in 2017. In contrast to previous studies, when analyzing the effects of women in important political positions on turnout, mediating channels such as changes in the pool of candidates and policy implications for voters after a close victory of a female candidate are taken into account. The results indicate no effect of women winning a close electoral race on female turnout in the future. These findings hold even when considering intermediate and possibly compensating channels affecting turnout.
